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Abstract 
This paper addresses the broad question ofwhere to locate authority for tropical biodiversity 
conservation considering: (1) community-based natural research management (CBNRM) 
overreaches the indisputable place of local communities in tropical conservation efforts; (2) the 
most promise for tropical conservation and development is offered by multiple layers of nested 
institutions; (3) the greatest challenge for implementation of multiple layer designs is weakness 
at all levels of existing tropical institutions; and (4) rehabilitating such institutions, facilitating 
ongoing coordination among them, and introducing new and appropriate institutional designs will 
require significant international and national policy reorientation and greater commitment of 
financial and technical assistance. 
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Locating Tropical Biodiversity Conservation
 
Amid Weak Institutions
 
An ideational revolution has fundamentally changed the complexion of tropical conservation and 
development over the past twenty years. In the 1960s-70s, deep-seated concern over the real or 
perceived weaknesses of both markets and local communities spurred the concentration of broad 
authority over matters of economic development and environmental protection in the hands of 
national bureaucracies. In response to real or perceived government failures under these 
arrangements, a defining feature of the past twenty years has been the ubiquitous roll-back of 
tropical states. In the realm of development, this has been manifest in pervasive market-oriented 
liberalization and promotion of indigenous nongovernmental organizations. In conservation, the 
movement has been largely to community-based natural resource management (CBNRM). But 
what happens if the institutions of both government agencies and communities are ill-equipped to 
handle the challenges ofbiodiverity conservation? 
In this paper, we address the broad question of where to locate authority for tropical 
biodiversity conservation. In so doing, we advance four claims. First, the current fashion for 
CBNRM overreaches the indisputable place of local communities in tropical conservation efforts. 
An unfortunate irony of the current celebration of local authority is that it facilitates the 
abdication of global responsibility. Second, given variability in scale and institutional capability, 
• 
hybrid designs involving multiple layers of nested institutions offer the most promise. Third, the 
greatest challenge to implementing such designs is the (often growing) weakness ofexisting 
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tropical institutions at all levels. Fourth, rehabilitating such institutions, facilitating ongoing 
coordination among them, and introducing new institutional forms appropriate to particular 
conservation challenges will require, at both international and national levels, significant policy 
reorientations and greater commitments of fmancial and technical assistance. The pace of reform, 
and levels of assistance will need to be substantially greater than presently prevail. 
The Seductive Appeal of Community-Based Natural Resource Management 
It is widely believed that the state-directed "fences and fines" approach ofprotected area 
management failed to ensure biodiversity conservation in the tropics and sub-tropics and has 
contributed in some places to the marginalization and poverty of the rural poor excluded from 
parks (1). Although we know of no careful, empirical test of this hypothesis, it has become 
received wisdom in conservation circles. In light of this belief, the possibility of "win-win" 
approaches in which conservation objectives can be reconciled with rural poverty alleviation and 
other intrinsically desirable goals holds considerable appeal. Hence the rising enthusiasm for 
strategies founded on community-based natural resource management (CBNRM), in which low­
income rural communities are "empowered" in an attempt both to capture locally the potential 
social benefits of sustainable resource use and to improve the application of scientific 
understanding and appropriate technologies to field-level conservation efforts (2). Community 
now seems the default locus ofmost tropical conservation activity. 
CBNRM understandably excites the interest and imaginations of conservation groups and • 
international development agencies. Although careful students ofCBNRM acknowledge that 
performance varies widely and depends on satisfying certain ecological and institutional 
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conditions, the discussion commonly sidesteps the deeper issues on which successful 
conservation efforts depend. In particular, implementation of CBNRM schemes too often 
proceeds from untested biological and socio-economic assumptions, some of which are likely to 
be false in many if not most situations (3). If these conditions and assumptions continue to be 
ignored, excessive focus on CBNRM projects may lead to squandered opportunities for both 
conservation and development and to inflamed tensions between poor tropical communities and 
outsiders interested in the ecosystems in which those communities dwell. This paper calls 
attention to those assumptions and to tries to place CBNRM within a broader suite of 
prospective conservation management options. 
Communities' Place In The Broader Conservation Challenge 
The major underlying assumption of CBNRM is that the local community is the 
appropriate locus of conservation management. This assumption subsumes within it other 
implicit, and often questionable assumptions, such as: the spatial scale of the ecosystem 
corresponds to that of the community; locals can control the exploitation problem; communities 
have incentives to overexploit resources if they are not involved in resource management; natural 
resource management is equivalent to management for biodiversity conservation; CBNRM will 
generate benefits that are sufficiently large and sustainable to keep locals from overexploitation; 
communities are reasonably homogenous and that this homogeneity produces successful 
collective action; communities have and can apply existing formal and informal rules to manage 
-

natural resources. If one acknowledges that such assumptions are not always and everywhere 
true, then the current fashion for devolving conservation management to local control whenever 
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possible overreaches. The problem is not so much putting resources at the disposal of local 
peoples or having them decide what to do with such resources, as it is rather ensuring that the 
incentives locals face truly encompass the full range of social costs and benefits associated with 
the biological resource. 
The core challenge of tropical environmental conservation is the problem of reconciling 
private and social incentives, or what economists term the problem of "externalities". As Hardin 
famously pointed out in articulating the "tragedy of the commons," individuals often have no 
incentive to take account of the common good of environmental conservation, and therefore they 
rationally overexploit the natural resource base (4). The core question of conservation 
management is "how can we most effectively reconcile individual and social incentives so as to 
achieve common environmental objectives?" The answer depends on two key, broad factors. 
Social and Ecological Scale 
First, one needs to identify the social and ecological scale of the externality. Hardin's 
example and much subsequent work on common property management regimes focused on 
resources for which there exist important externalities among a spatially compact group of 
individuals. Rangeland grazing, maintenance of common irrigation infrastructure, and forest 
management are familiar examples (5). As a voluminous analytical and empirical literature 
demonstrates, there is most certainly a role for rural communities in halting natural resource 
degradation in such settings (6). When the core problem is environmental conservation for the • 
maintenance of ecosystem services valued primarily, if not exclusively, by local residents, 
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community is sensibly the default locus of conservation management, although tough institutional 
questions remain (on which, more below). 
But demands for in situ biodiversity conservation often relate to externalities that are both 
ecologically and socially broader. Even granting that communities can manage small areas, in 
many settings what is ecologically necessary far exceeds the space any single community can 
ably manage. Although distinct communities may share a common interest in a stationary 
terrestrial resource, such as forest and pasture, they do not necessarily have either tradition or 
means of reconciling their competing interests. The problem becomes especially evident in the 
case of migratory species, such as birds, butterflies, fish, and some ungulates. Can anyone 
community effectively conserve whales or wildebeest? 
The problem is not merely the ecological scale of the externalities, but also the social 
scale, the spatial range of people with an interest in tropical biodiversity protection. Distant 
human populations may have considerable interest in the conservation of carbon sinks in tropical 
rainforests, of ecosystems with high rates ofendemism that might contain genetic material of 
incalculable value to medicine or agriculture, and ofcharismatic meg¢'auna of spiritual or aesthetic 
value. The trick is how to incorporate outsiders' valuation ofnatural resources into local use 
decisions. The international Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) attempted a Coasian 
solution to this problem by granting to host nations sovereign rights over the natural resources 
contained within their borders. But the substantial transactions costs ofmatching, for example, a 
California conservationist to forest dwellers in the Central African Republic, means that only a • 
trivial portion of the external valuation ofnatural resources can be captured in commercial 
transfers associated with ecotourism, bioprospecting, or the marketing of nontimber forest 
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products (7). Official and nonprofit transfers do not begin to make up the difference. In Kenya, 
for example, the cost of protected area management is almost 3% ofGDP, only a modest fraction 
of which comes from external donors (8). It is unrealistic to expect continued highly regressive 
fmancing ofconservation efforts of global benefit on anything approaching ecologically-sensible 
scales, such as the IUCN's recommendation that 10-12 percent of each country's land mass be 
devoted to conservation. The expansion of community-based designs to suit the ecological scale 
of many conservation challenges runs headlong into formidable institutional challenges as to how 
to incorporate the enormous range ofhuman interests. 
A special concern we have with respect to the current fervor for community-based 
conservation is that it may deflect attention from the appropriate scale of burden-sharing. If the 
benefits of biodiversity conservation accrue well beyond the boundaries of local communities - to 
those who stand to benefit from future discoveries based on heretofore unrecognized genetic 
material, from global ecosystem services provided by tropical habitats, or from the mere existence 
of exotic species - then the costs must likewise be distributed more broadly. Celebration of the 
virtues of community can paradoxically turn into abdicating broader responsibilities, leaving the 
poor to bear the burden ofprotecting resources we all enjoy. 
Interests and Institutions 
The appropriate level at which to situate authority for conservation management is also a 
function of the social context: the actors and their respective interests, and the internal and 
­
external institutions that shape individual and collective choice. "Community" is itself rarely 
defined or carefully examined by proponents of CBNRM, who tend to portray, or even define 
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communities as a homogeneous group of people, as a unified, organic whole (9). But the myth of 
the "happy hut" has no firmer historical standing than the myth of the ecologically noble savage 
(10). Communities encompass gender and generational divides, individuals harboring different 
aspirations, leadership rivalries, and varying degrees and kinds of resource (over)exploitation 
(11). When there exist predictable rules and institutions that guide the interaction of actors with 
divergent goals, it is possible, although still not simple, at a local scale to identify and implement 
mechanisms by which individual incentives can be simultaneously aligned with the collective 
interest. The task becomes harder where economic, social, or technological conditions are highly 
variable or rapidly changing, since effective inducements can likewise change quickly (5). In the 
face of such complexity and in the name of respecting sovereignty, external promoters of 
CBNRM commonly deal directly with national and local leaders. As a consequence, even 
seemingly successful initiatives commonly become coopted by national political movements or 
local elites (12). 
Successful conservation institutions, at whatever scale, must have the authority and 
ability to restrict access and use, to offer incentives to sustainable use of resources - which may 
mean no use at all - and to monitor conditions and make necessary adaptations to access rules 
and incentives (13). CBNRM schemes too often overemphasize incentives and underemphasize 
the other two necessary ingredients. Conservation schemes based primarily on positive 
inducements require benefit flows that are both large enough to be spread throughout the 
community, and temporally responsive to locals' adherence to resource use rules. It is difficult 
­
to meet both conditions. While some projects may enjoy success due to the massive external aid 
and/or the high returns from safari hunting, few countries can rely on such financial resources. In 
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particular, poor households are often assumed to have a fixed income need, and if projects can 
help households meet this need without consumptive recourse to natural resources, conservation 
goals will be advanced. The more common outcome, however, has been that a combination of 
increased income, absent social controls and project linkages, has simply allowed people to use 
resources more rapidly or that unanticipated shocks lead to conjunctural crises because schemes 
are ill-equipped to respond appropriately to evolving demands (14). 
Community-based incentives work best when there are strong (formal or informal) local 
systems of social control and sanction to enforce access restrictions. In much of the tropics, 
however, weakness is the norm. Traditional community management systems are often 
overwhelmed, eroded or non-existent, resource markets are commonly incomplete and inefficient, 
and nation states are generally fiscally and politically fragile. When the scale-based default locus 
of conservation authority is institutionally ill-equipped for the task, it makes sense to consider 
relocating responsibility to higher level organizational units. For many years, the management 
capabilities ofnation states were heavily overrated and those of local communities underrated. 
We fear that the reverse is true today. 
One must be careful, however, not to equate higher level coordination with govenunent. 
Alternative mechanisms exist, including federations, collectivities of interest groups, unions, etc., 
and can be effective in particular settings (15). Especially in the tropics, it seems imperative that 
we move beyond dichotomous conceptualizations ofconservation management alternatives as 
either community-based or state-centered, expand the menu ofavailable institutions, and improve • 
the capability of existing institutions to handle the task. This must occur at both the intra- and 
inter-national levels. Despite the attempts of the Global Environmental Facility to address global 
9 
public goods associated with biodiversity conservation, no true mechanism yet exists for handling 
conservation challenges that cut across communities separated by national boundaries or to 
address the disparities between costs and benefits received at local, national, and international 
levels. 
Decoupling Conservation and Development 
Embedded within much of the contemporary dialogue is a facile assumption that poverty 
mitigation will improve biodiversity conservation. The relationship between poverty alleviation 
and conservation is complex and highly variable across space. Sometimes synergistic relations 
exist; sometimes the tradeoffs between improving human welfare and protecting the host 
environment are stark (16). The poor are neither the sole agents of destruction nor the only 
beneficiaries of conservation, and in many contexts are only weakly related to either. So while 
rural development may be necessary to tropical biodiversity conservation, it is certainly not 
sufficient. 
Poverty and environmental problems have common structural factors in need of attention. 
But the range of environmentally friendly development or poverty alleviating conservation 
opportunities may be relatively limited. And policies aimed at trying to rectify two complex 
problems too often violate the Tinbergen principle of one policy instrument per objective, and 
thereby fail to address either aim satisfactorily. The core need is for sensible policies to rectify 
the asset poverty and vulnerability that too often causes poor people to overexploit the natural 
­
environment, to eliminate local and international elites' cheap access to scarce resources, to 
provide for proper protection of unique ecosystems, and to institutionalize compensatory 
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transfers between and within nations sufficient to reflect the spatial breadth and economic depth 
of environmental externalities (17). 
Adaptive Management and the Need for Nested, Strengthened Institutions 
Much of the current literature in ecology emphasizes the need for adaptive design and 
management. This guidance applies as much to the task of identifying the appropriate locus of 
conservation authority in a given setting as it does to the exercise of that authority. Neither 
CBNRM nor state-managed parks are always and everywhere appropriate. Sometimes the scale 
of the resource is too vast or local institutions too weak for community-based conservation to 
work. Likewise, sometimes the problem's scale is too local or larger-scale institutions too weak 
for state-directed conservation to succeed. Further, lest we forget the construction of 
conservation institutions is more than an exercise in optimizing over biological and economic 
parameters, the political costs and benefits of institutional creation and maintenance can also 
scuttle the best-made technical designs. The specific conditions prevailing with respect to any 
given resource in need of conservation vary widely enough that a portfolio approach involving 
coordinated nested institutions at multiple levels is surely necessary (18). Two problems 
immediately emerge. 
First, relatively little theory or rigorous empirical evidence exists on how to distinguish 
and integrate management objectives and instruments across an array ofbiodiverse habitats of 
different scales, much less on how to coordinate the activities of multiple layers of conservation ­
.. 
institutions each targeted at these different scales. As a starting point, it appears clear that the 
operational institutions of conservation should be matched to the spatial and temporal scale of 
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the underlying externality problem and the institutional capabilities at different levels of 
organization. And because the distribution ofnatural resources is a fundamentally political 
exercise, this also means that those individuals and groups with a stake in or significant influence 
over the externality problem must be included. 
Investment needs to be directed less to communities or to parks per se, and more toward 
understanding and fostering flexible institutional arrangements at all scales - community, 
cooperatives, federations of communities or cooperatives, markets, local, regional, and national 
governments, and multinational agencies - that are predisposed to and capable of mediating and 
inducing desirable conservation and development outcomes. This includes widespread support 
of efforts to inculcate environmental values and respect for pluralism so that individuals are 
increasingly open and able to participate responsibly in such institutions, and have the ability to 
reshape it in the face of changing circumstances (19). Our limited understanding of institutional 
design and effect demands that research and practice focus on a wider set of institutional 
solutions, including hybrid institutional arrangements, such as comanagement and other forms of 
government, community, private sector arrangements. 
Second, the challenge lies not so much in nesting institutions - communities are already 
nested within bureaucratic constraints, which in turn operate within a broader political arena, etc. 
- but in ensuring the competence of each constituent part and effective coordination among them. 
The main difference between relatively successful conservation initiatives in some parts of the 
high-income world and failed efforts in the low-income world relates less to differences in wealth • 
.. 
or income than to the strength of the underlying institutions of community, state, and market. At 
the heart of most conservation success stories one finds decision-takers who themselves face 
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appropriate incentives related to conservation outcomes, who are committed to two-way 
communication with all stakeholders, and who are able to marshal and distribute resources enough 
to significantly alter resource users' incentives, to include providing appropriate compensation to 
those whose access becomes restricted (l,2,5,20). While the feedback relationship between 
economic and institutional development is complex and still poorly understood, more emphasis 
needs to be placed on fmning up the foundations of the institutions of individual and collective 
choice. Unfortunately, neither dysfunctional communities nor inept bureaucracies are easily 
reformed. In some places and for some conservation objectives, the best bet will lie in creating 
new, responsive, and less traditional institutional structures (21). 
Where all existing institutions are weak, communities don't trump parks, nor vice versa. 
And even where we find strong communities, it would be overly optimistic to think they can· 
continue to operate effectively without other institutions to help support them. Successful 
alternatives to failed, centralized approaches and simplistic community-based models will need to 
include clear and enforced rules that relate directly to the externalities of the resource and the 
costs ofmulti-level collective action. Since the benefits of tropical biodiversity conservation 
typically extend far beyond the communities of local resource users or the boundaries of their 
nations, a significant share of the costs of developing and maintaining the institutional capacity to 
internalize biodiversity externalities necessarily must fall on wealthy foreign individuals, 
organizations, and nations. Tropical biodiversity conservation cannot be achieved on the cheap. 
The global beneficiaries of biodiversity must not abdicate complete authority and responsibility • 
to either tropical states or indigenous communities, but rather must work to improve the capacity 
of nested institutions to induce and enforce tropical conservation. 
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